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
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

CIA/ RS IM 62-13

20 March 1963  
OCI No. 1132/63

SUBJECT: Some Observations on the Size and Combat Readiness  
of Soviet Ground Forces

1. This brief memorandum has been prepared as a research aid for analysts currently engaged in the difficult task of reevaluating U.S. national estimates on the size and strength of Soviet ground forces. <sup>25X1C</sup>



3. The main findings of this report--based on evidence dated as late as May-June 1962--are as follows:

(a) There will not be a major reorganization of the ground troops in the near future--at least insofar as the Soviet military hierarchy is concerned.

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
(b) TO&E's of existing divisions may be subject to further paring down in the interest of promoting their combat mobility.

(c) To compare Soviet divisions with U.S. divisions is to compare apples with oranges.

(d) With some possible exceptions, the only ground divisions that are maintained at combat ready strength are those composing the Groups of Soviet Forces in East Germany, Hungary and Poland, and the border military districts of the USSR.

(e) As to exceptions to the rule, some divisions in the border district forces are said to be under strength, while some divisions located in the depth of the USSR may be combat ready.

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(c) [redacted] was advanced in the overt Soviet Ministry of Defense book "Military Strategy," which was also published in spring 1962. A chapter of the book identified with the "radical" theorist Col. Gen. Gastilovich included the following passage: "Taking into account the threat of a surprise attack by an enemy using present-day means of massive assault and the resulting difficulties in mobilization, it would seem advisable to have peacetime armed forces set up so that the main aims of the initial phase of the war can be attained without additional mobilization. However, to keep the armed forces in such a state is economically impossible for even the strongest country. Therefore it is necessary to keep in a state of constant readiness only the strategic forces and weapons...the air defense system of the country, and certain of the other types of armed forces: ground troops, naval forces, the air force, and civil-defense forces. The composition of these latter types of forces is, as a rule, increased at the outset of a war by mobilization." The author then went on to delineate three categories of readiness and mobilization among the ground troops: "Some of the ground troop units intended to carry out the first operations and deployed in the border regions are kept in peacetime at a strength which will ensure the carrying out of the main tasks of the initial phase of the war. Another group has a short mobilization period, thereby

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enabling it to participate in the first operations of the war. Finally, a certain group is kept at reduced strength in peacetime." The author went on to say that the combat-ready ground troops must be "much stronger" than cover forces were in past wars.



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